{"id":1241,"date":"2015-07-04T10:45:14","date_gmt":"2015-07-04T00:45:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?p=1241"},"modified":"2017-01-17T01:46:24","modified_gmt":"2017-01-16T14:46:24","slug":"operational-research-in-south-vietnam-1965-1972","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?p=1241","title":{"rendered":"Operational Research in South Vietnam"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><em>Courtesy and copyright of E S Holt. Photos courtesy of Norm Gomm.<\/em><\/p>\n<div style=\"padding-left: 25px; max-width: 25%; float: right;\">\n<div id='gallery-1' class='gallery galleryid-1241 gallery-columns-1 gallery-size-medium'><dl class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<dt class='gallery-icon portrait'>\n\t\t\t\t<a href='https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?attachment_id=1243'><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"257\" height=\"296\" src=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/XM203.jpg\" class=\"attachment-medium size-medium\" alt=\"\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-1243\" srcset=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/XM203.jpg 257w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/XM203-100x115.jpg 100w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 257px) 100vw, 257px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class='wp-caption-text gallery-caption' id='gallery-1-1243'>\n\t\t\t\tDemonstrating the XM 203 M16 fitted with an underslung 40mm grenade launcher\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><dl class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<dt class='gallery-icon landscape'>\n\t\t\t\t<a href='https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?attachment_id=1244'><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"300\" height=\"192\" src=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/6lb-inflatable-SAS-boat-inflated-300x192.jpg\" class=\"attachment-medium size-medium\" alt=\"\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-1244\" srcset=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/6lb-inflatable-SAS-boat-inflated-300x192.jpg 300w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/6lb-inflatable-SAS-boat-inflated-100x64.jpg 100w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/6lb-inflatable-SAS-boat-inflated.jpg 438w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class='wp-caption-text gallery-caption' id='gallery-1-1244'>\n\t\t\t\tThe 6-lb boat fully inflated\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><dl class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<dt class='gallery-icon portrait'>\n\t\t\t\t<a href='https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?attachment_id=1245'><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"265\" height=\"300\" src=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/6lb-inflatable-SAS-boat-265x300.jpg\" class=\"attachment-medium size-medium\" alt=\"\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-1245\" srcset=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/6lb-inflatable-SAS-boat-265x300.jpg 265w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/6lb-inflatable-SAS-boat-100x113.jpg 100w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/6lb-inflatable-SAS-boat.jpg 399w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 265px) 100vw, 265px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class='wp-caption-text gallery-caption' id='gallery-1-1245'>\n\t\t\t\tThis 6-lb inflatable boat was used by the SAS\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><dl class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<dt class='gallery-icon portrait'>\n\t\t\t\t<a href='https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?attachment_id=1246'><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"242\" height=\"300\" src=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/ADE-XH-6-delay-firing-device-242x300.jpg\" class=\"attachment-medium size-medium\" alt=\"\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-1246\" srcset=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/ADE-XH-6-delay-firing-device-242x300.jpg 242w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/ADE-XH-6-delay-firing-device-100x124.jpg 100w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/ADE-XH-6-delay-firing-device.jpg 382w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 242px) 100vw, 242px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class='wp-caption-text gallery-caption' id='gallery-1-1246'>\n\t\t\t\tThe ADE XH-6 Delay Firing Device\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><dl class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<dt class='gallery-icon landscape'>\n\t\t\t\t<a href='https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?attachment_id=1247'><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"300\" height=\"200\" src=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Air-America-aircraft-300x200.jpg\" class=\"attachment-medium size-medium\" alt=\"\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-1247\" srcset=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Air-America-aircraft-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Air-America-aircraft-100x67.jpg 100w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Air-America-aircraft.jpg 410w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class='wp-caption-text gallery-caption' id='gallery-1-1247'>\n\t\t\t\tFrom the left, Captain Pearson (ARPA), Major Barnard (ARPA), Captain Norm Gomm (FORS), Major Smith (FORS). The team were about to depart by Air America, the CIA\u2019s private airline, to visit a US Special Forces activity\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><dl class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<dt class='gallery-icon landscape'>\n\t\t\t\t<a href='https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?attachment_id=1248'><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"300\" height=\"200\" src=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/CAPT-Norm-Gomm-300x200.jpg\" class=\"attachment-medium size-medium\" alt=\"\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-1248\" srcset=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/CAPT-Norm-Gomm-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/CAPT-Norm-Gomm-100x67.jpg 100w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/CAPT-Norm-Gomm.jpg 421w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class='wp-caption-text gallery-caption' id='gallery-1-1248'>\n\t\t\t\tCaptain Norm Gomm of FORS at Nui Dat\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><dl class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<dt class='gallery-icon landscape'>\n\t\t\t\t<a href='https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?attachment_id=1249'><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"300\" height=\"289\" src=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Claymore-multiple-firing-device-300x289.jpg\" class=\"attachment-medium size-medium\" alt=\"\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-1249\" srcset=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Claymore-multiple-firing-device-300x289.jpg 300w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Claymore-multiple-firing-device-100x96.jpg 100w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Claymore-multiple-firing-device.jpg 369w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class='wp-caption-text gallery-caption' id='gallery-1-1249'>\n\t\t\t\tThis experimental firing device was later adopted for service. It could be used to control the fire of multiple banks of claymore mines or other explosive devices\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><dl class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<dt class='gallery-icon landscape'>\n\t\t\t\t<a href='https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?attachment_id=1250'><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"300\" height=\"206\" src=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/FORS-tent-lines-in-Nui-Dat-300x206.jpg\" class=\"attachment-medium size-medium\" alt=\"\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-1250\" srcset=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/FORS-tent-lines-in-Nui-Dat-300x206.jpg 300w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/FORS-tent-lines-in-Nui-Dat-100x69.jpg 100w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/FORS-tent-lines-in-Nui-Dat.jpg 412w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class='wp-caption-text gallery-caption' id='gallery-1-1250'>\n\t\t\t\tThe FORS tent lines at Nui Dat\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><dl class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<dt class='gallery-icon landscape'>\n\t\t\t\t<a href='https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?attachment_id=1251'><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"300\" height=\"201\" src=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Log-periodic-antenna-Nui-Dat-300x201.jpg\" class=\"attachment-medium size-medium\" alt=\"\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-1251\" srcset=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Log-periodic-antenna-Nui-Dat-300x201.jpg 300w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Log-periodic-antenna-Nui-Dat-100x67.jpg 100w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Log-periodic-antenna-Nui-Dat.jpg 411w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class='wp-caption-text gallery-caption' id='gallery-1-1251'>\n\t\t\t\tThe log periodic antenna \u2018borrowed\u2019 from 7th US Air Force and installed on SAS hill at Nui Dat to establish long-range communications with deployed SAS patrols. The SAS liked it so much they took it with them when the Task Force withdrew from Nui Dat\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><dl class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<dt class='gallery-icon portrait'>\n\t\t\t\t<a href='https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?attachment_id=1252'><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"230\" height=\"300\" src=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Repurposed-mini-gun-230x300.jpg\" class=\"attachment-medium size-medium\" alt=\"\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-1252\" srcset=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Repurposed-mini-gun-230x300.jpg 230w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Repurposed-mini-gun-100x131.jpg 100w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Repurposed-mini-gun.jpg 330w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 230px) 100vw, 230px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class='wp-caption-text gallery-caption' id='gallery-1-1252'>\n\t\t\t\tMini-gun converted for ground use at a CIDG Fire Support Base\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><dl class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<dt class='gallery-icon landscape'>\n\t\t\t\t<a href='https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?attachment_id=1253'><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"262\" height=\"247\" src=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Squad-radios.jpg\" class=\"attachment-medium size-medium\" alt=\"\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-1253\" srcset=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Squad-radios.jpg 262w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/Squad-radios-100x94.jpg 100w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 262px) 100vw, 262px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class='wp-caption-text gallery-caption' id='gallery-1-1253'>\n\t\t\t\tDispersed operations called for radio communications down to section level. FORS trialled the use of a range of squad radios like those above\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><dl class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<dt class='gallery-icon landscape'>\n\t\t\t\t<a href='https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?attachment_id=1254'><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"300\" height=\"198\" src=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/VHF-radio-helium-baloon-300x198.jpg\" class=\"attachment-medium size-medium\" alt=\"\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-1254\" srcset=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/VHF-radio-helium-baloon-300x198.jpg 300w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/VHF-radio-helium-baloon-100x66.jpg 100w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/VHF-radio-helium-baloon.jpg 481w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class='wp-caption-text gallery-caption' id='gallery-1-1254'>\n\t\t\t\tHelium filled balloons like this lifted VHF radios above SAS hill at Nui Dat so that line of sight communications could be established with SAS patrols deployed to the fringes of the Province\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><dl class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<dt class='gallery-icon landscape'>\n\t\t\t\t<a href='https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?attachment_id=1255'><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"300\" height=\"268\" src=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/XM174-300x268.jpg\" class=\"attachment-medium size-medium\" alt=\"\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-1255\" srcset=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/XM174-300x268.jpg 300w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/XM174-100x89.jpg 100w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/XM174.jpg 389w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class='wp-caption-text gallery-caption' id='gallery-1-1255'>\n\t\t\t\tXM 174 (2) a multi-shot 40mm grenade launcher\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><dl class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<dt class='gallery-icon portrait'>\n\t\t\t\t<a href='https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?attachment_id=1256'><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"232\" height=\"300\" src=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/XM191-ready-to-fire-232x300.jpg\" class=\"attachment-medium size-medium\" alt=\"\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-1256\" srcset=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/XM191-ready-to-fire-232x300.jpg 232w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/XM191-ready-to-fire-100x129.jpg 100w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/XM191-ready-to-fire.jpg 246w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 232px) 100vw, 232px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class='wp-caption-text gallery-caption' id='gallery-1-1256'>\n\t\t\t\tXM 191 ready to fire\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><dl class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<dt class='gallery-icon landscape'>\n\t\t\t\t<a href='https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/?attachment_id=1257'><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"300\" height=\"222\" src=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/XM191-300x222.jpg\" class=\"attachment-medium size-medium\" alt=\"\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-1257\" srcset=\"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/XM191-300x222.jpg 300w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/XM191-100x74.jpg 100w, https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/XM191.jpg 397w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class='wp-caption-text gallery-caption' id='gallery-1-1257'>\n\t\t\t\tThe XM 191 was similar to a 4-shot M72 but fired a rocket propelled warhead filled with a napalm-like substance\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\n<\/div>\n<p>Operational Research arose out of the Battle of Britain, in WWII. It had been foreshadowed by F. W. Lanchester in <em>Aircraft in warfare: the dawn of the fourth arm<\/em>, written in 1916. Described as \u2018a scientific method of providing executive departments\u00a0with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding operations under their control\u2019, and instigated by Professor P. M. S. Blackett,\u00a0the methods of scientific research were applied on a large scale to the study of the performance of new types of equipment, and to the operations of war.<\/p>\n<p>Describing a case of outstanding achievement by Operations Research, Sir Charles Goodeve, in <em>Operations Research, 1948,<\/em> wrote \u2018as is well known, we had in 1940 few fighter aircraft compared with the number that would have been needed to defend (Britain\u2019s) shores. It would have been\u00a0impossible to obtain sufficient interceptions.\u2019 With the invention of radar, which allowed the retention of fighter\u00a0aircraft on the ground until needed, \u2018Ground Control\u2019 was able to direct aircraft to a position where the enemy aircraft could be sighted visually and attacked. A small party of scientists was attached to Fighter Command to study and refine the efficiency of the interception system. These scientists learned to estimate which targets were \u2018good\u2019 and which were \u2018bad\u2019, and to determine where and how the limited resources could be most effectively used. Radar is estimated to have increased the possibility of interception by a factor of about ten: and this small research team increased the probability by a factor of two, which together meant that the Air Force was made 20 times more powerful, a doubling which was out of all proportion to the amount of effort spent on the research.<\/p>\n<p>During WWII, an Australian group sponsored by Major-General J. S. Whitelaw began work with the Army Operational Research Group which was under Dr D. F. Martyn\u2019s\u00a0leadership in June 1942. Martyn\u2019s group concentrated their efforts on weapons research, more specifically on the capabilities of radar. He recruited mainly science graduates with honours degrees in physics and mathematics &#8211; not men with experience in engineering. One of these graduates was George Cawsey, who later became Scientific Advisor to the Military Board, (SAMB) in 1964.<\/p>\n<p>Cawsey was a brilliant scientist and a clever organiser. In 1965 he convinced Brigadier G. D. Solomon that the Australian Army Group sent to South Vietnam must be accompanied by a Field Operational Research capability. Solomon was also a graduate not only of Staff College (UK) but also of the Royal Military College of Science (RMCS), located at Shrivenham in England. It was therefore not circumstantial that the military officers\u00a0selected for Field Operational Section, Vietnam, or FORS-V, were mostly graduates\u00a0from RMCS. The civilian scientists who were posted to FORS-V were principally mathematics or physics graduates, temporarily promoted to captain for the duration of their service with FORS.<\/p>\n<p>FORS consisted of two officers &#8211; the Officer Commanding being a Major and the second in command being the civilian scientist &#8211; and a clerical sergeant with sufficiently high security clearances for the work FORS would be doing in Vietnam.<\/p>\n<p>Due to politics and restrictions imposed on troop strength in Vietnam, this staff was never increased. There were two officers and a sergeant when the Australian forces consisted of a battalion group, and still three when the Australian Army in Vietnam had increased to three battalions, with three batteries of artillery, a squadron of Engineers, and a squadron of tanks, not to mention the 1<sup>st<\/sup> Australian Logistic Support Group at Vung Tau and all the supporting arms and units needed to keep the three battalion task Force operational.<\/p>\n<p>Initially located with the US Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) at Saigon, and working from HQ AFV, also in Saigon, one of the first tasks given to FORS by the US Commander was to develop a data base. \u2018If you don\u2019t have a data base, how can you begin to study the operational requirements of\u00a0your Aussie forces.\u2019 Major Ian Meibusch, the first OC of FORS-V, set about developing a data base.<\/p>\n<p>A small report called After Action Contact Report was developed by FORS and sent to 1<sup>st<\/sup> battalion, Royal Australian Regiment. To begin, the report was acceptable back at FORS if it was written in pencil on a page torn from a field notebook. FORS began to find out just what had happened in contacts with the enemy, the Viet Cong \/People\u2019s Army of Vietnam (often referred to in Vietnam war-era documents as the North Vietnamese Army, or NVA). The questions included:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>How many rounds were fired in the contact and by whom?<\/li>\n<li>What initiated the contact?<\/li>\n<li>Who initiated the contact?<\/li>\n<li>How was it initiated?<\/li>\n<li>What casualties were sustained by both sides?<\/li>\n<li>Who fired the first shot?<\/li>\n<li>What weapons were used by both sides?<\/li>\n<li>When did the contact occur and how long did it last?<\/li>\n<li>What was the map reference?<\/li>\n<li>And always at the end, \u2018What lessons were learned?\u2019<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The wording of the questionnaire was\u00a0refined as more information was found out about contacts with the enemy and the data base began to build. A separate problem occurred, however, in that units began to use the \u2018Contact After Action Report\u2019\u00a0 in the Battalion\u2019s much lengthier After Action Report, which increased and increased in size as Commanding Officers began to write\u00a0 at length about an operation which may have lasted four to eight weeks. Platoon commanders were required to have their After Action Contact Reports\u00a0typed and run through a messy ink \u2018Gestetner\u2019 machine needed to produce the number of copies required at Company and Battalion Headquarters. Task Force required\u00a0multiple copies for distribution to 2 Field Force-V, HQ AFV in Saigon, and multiple copies to be sent back to Australia\u00a0for senior officers to read and engage in tooth-sucking exercises.<\/p>\n<p>The After Action Contact Reports which were sent on to Scientific Advisors Office were neatly recorded on \u2018The Holey Man\u2019,\u00a0 a larger than life-sized array of graph sheets glued together, representing the outline of a human figure.\u00a0 The position of the wounds received were entered on the figure, and referenced to a numbered Contact Report.<\/p>\n<p>This \u2018Holey Man\u2019 was used to dissuade the then Engineer in Chief who wanted to spend the not inconsiderable amount of $25,000 in 1967 to investigate injuries caused by panji stakes, which were either fire hardened and sharpened bamboos stakes or later were metal spikes, hidden in the long grass around a Viet Cong village to injure a soldier who stumbled or fell to the ground, or who threw himself down in the grass when firing began. The \u2018Holey Man\u2019 showed that there had only been two serious panji spike injuries since the Australians went to Vietnam\u00a0 in 1965.<\/p>\n<p>The \u2018Holey Man\u2019 also showed that 33% of injuries to Australian were \u00a0caused by \u00a0mine explosions \u2013 usually the same M16 mines which\u00a0 a Task Force Commander had ordered to be laid \u00a0through paddy fields and crops\u00a0 from the Task Force outpost at \u2018The Horseshoe\u2019 feature to the coast, a distance of about 10 kilometres. The VC and villagers were digging up these M16 mines and using them against us. They reasoned \u2018Why go to all the trouble of sharpening bamboo stakes when\u00a0 one well laid M16 mine could cause so much more damage?\u2019<\/p>\n<p>Many of the M16 mines had a hand-grenade attached underneath it to hopefully\u00a0prevent the mine from being lifted, so the VC reasoned \u2018Why not use one of the hand-grenades and a trip wire outside the village rather than sharpened bamboo stakes?\u2019 Panji stakes almost disappeared from Viet Cong defences.<\/p>\n<p>The Engineer in Chief recognised immediately that his $25,000 would be better spent on researching ways to defeat mines and hand grenades used by the VC\/NVA against the Australian Forces.<\/p>\n<p>As the CO of ACTIV had said to Major Ian Meibusch in 1965 \u2018If you don\u2019t have a data base, how can you begin to study the operational requirements of\u00a0your Aussie forces?\u2019<\/p>\n<p>FORS was directed to solve many problems, including finding a way to defeat Falciparum malaria, a virulent form of malaria being brought down the Ho Chi Minh Trail by North Vietnamese soldiers. At one time after operations in the May Tao mountain area, the infantry had 50% casualties from malaria, a high rate which could not be sustained by the Task Force.<\/p>\n<p>On being told by Army Headquarters Melbourne that the high incidence of malaria in his operational troops was simply a matter of discipline, the Commander AFV, Major General A. L. MacDonald, responded with a roar which was possibly heard\u00a0in Hanoi. It was certainly heard at AHQ in Australia.<\/p>\n<p>Shouting for OC\u00a0FORS, MacDonald asked \u2018can you design and run a trial to see if this new anti-malaria tablet can really be used to defeat malaria at Task Force?\u2019 He added that the US Walter Reed Military Hospital had attempted\u00a0to trial these Dapsone tablets in Vietnam and had failed embarrassingly. It is now history that the FORS trial was hugely successful, a fact which A. L. MacDonald largely enjoyed relating to HQ MACV, the Headquarters of the American Forces in Vietnam. Falciparum malaria casualties dropped\u00a0to zero in the test group, and Dapsone was introduced, dramatically reducing malaria casualties in the Australian Forces in Vietnam.<\/p>\n<p>This, of course, was not specifically a FORS task. Army should have sent a team of medical and scientific officers to Vietnam to investigate and report on the falciparum malaria problem, but politics controlled the maximum number of personnel who could be in Vietnam at any one time, and the ceiling had been reached at least two years earlier. This was another reason why FORS was not allowed to increase its staff as the size of the Australian commitment doubled and doubled again.<\/p>\n<p>It is interesting to note that a second Army Operational Team sent out from UK to Australia in 1943 were given a charter which more closely matched the work that FORS-V found itself doing in Vietnam. Its charter was biased towards the study of weapons and equipment, principally in the collection of factual and scientific data on the performance and tactical handling of operational equipment &#8211; our own and the also the enemy\u2019s.<\/p>\n<p>\u2018The primary function of an operational research section\u2019, wrote Lieutenant General John Northcott in 1943,<\/p>\n<p>is to establish factual evidence in forward areas on both tactical and technical value of weapons and equipment. This evidence is obtained by:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>The collection and critical analysis of facts and quantitative data of military problems as opportunity offers\u00a0and by critical appreciation of new or modified weapons before or after they reach the user;<\/li>\n<li>Scientific assistance in the planning and reporting of trials and experiments carried out locally and in the solution to immediate problems, such as countering new enemy weapons or techniques;<\/li>\n<li>Collection and critical analysis of eyewitness reports and opinions from both our own troops and prisoners of war.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>The role of FORS-V could not have been set out any more accurately than this. However, to believe that two officers, one a civilian scientist in uniform and the other a graduate of RMCS, could manage to competently cover all aspects of the task in South Vietnam, was patently\u00a0ludicrous.<\/p>\n<p>The equally-ludicrous requirement set by AHQ Canberra &#8211;\u00a0for FORS to also study the problems of organization and logistics of the US Army in South Vietnam &#8211; was ignored, as the small staff soon became deeply involved in detailing the need for improved weapons and equipment for the Australian Forces in Vietnam, and the introduction of new or experimental\u00a0weapons and equipment by the US Army.<\/p>\n<p>Below are just three examples of major projects undertaken by FORS-V during one twelve month period, to which can be added the successful Dapsone counter-malaria trial:<\/p>\n<p>The SAS Squadron needed reliable communications at all times for their patrols operating in and behind enemy lines. Thinking laterally, FORS-V officer Captain Tom Millane, \u2018borrowed\u2019 a huge log-periodic antenna from 7<sup>th<\/sup> US Air Force, and Detachment 152 Signals Squadron erected it on SAS Hill at the Task Force Base at Nui Dat. This antenna was arranged so that it sent high frequency transmissions vertically upwards, where the signal could be reflected\u00a0from the ionosphere and received by an SAS patrol which did not have line-of-sight back to SAS Hill. SAS liked the LPH-17 antenna so much they \u2018forgot\u2019 to return it to 7<sup>th<\/sup> US Air Force, and took it with them when the Task Force Base at Nui Dat was vacated.<\/p>\n<p>Captain Millane also arranged to \u2018borrow\u2019 several barrage balloons from 7<sup>th<\/sup> US Air Force, which, when filled with 170 cubic metres of helium, carried a VHF radio and cables high above SAS Hill to provide line-of-sight VHF communications\u00a0 to SAS \u00a0patrols. \u2018It was like having the Ops Officer standing alongside me providing info direct to the patrol\u2019 said one extremely grateful SAS signalman.<\/p>\n<p>OC FORS, Major \u2018Tim\u2019 Holt, put a plan to the COMAFV for a roller, made from water pipe and old truck tyres, to be towed offset to one side of an M16 armoured personnel carrier, to render the notorious Task Force &#8216;Barrier Minefield\u2019 safe. It was a paper study which drew information from US Army Field Handbooks, a chance photograph in the American \u2018Stars &amp; Stripes\u2019 newspaper, and the lateral thinking with which Australians seem to be abundantly blessed. 1 Field Squadron\u2019s Light Aid Detachment cobbled the roller together, and although &#8211; to quote one APC driver \u2018It was a (expletive deleted) pig to steer\u2019 it did the job and, and for the first time since it had been laid, the Task Force minefield ceased to be a source of M16 mines and hand-grenades to the enemy.<\/p>\n<p>The Royal Australian Air Force did not have an Operational Research capability during the Vietnam War, although it had been keen to use OR during the latter stages of WWII. Defence keenly employed several operational research teams during the recent Afghan War, with an increasing awareness of the value of operational research in all its facets.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Editor\u2019s note:<\/strong> For those interested in further research on FORS and its activities in Vietnam, and the application of science to combat operations, there are a large number of FORS files held in the collection of the Australian War Memorial. The following examples show the range of subjects dealt with by the small FORS team:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>AWM98, <a href=\"http:\/\/recordsearch.naa.gov.au\/SearchNRetrieve\/Interface\/DetailsReports\/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=3295221&amp;isAv=N\">R237\/1\/22\/1 PART 2<\/a>, [Headquarters, Australian Force Vietnam (HQ AFV):] Correspondence &#8211; General &#8211; FORS [Field Operations Research Section] &#8211; SAO [Senior Administrative Officer] &#8211; [Includes material on casualty reports, soil samples, sound ranging system at Nui Dat, report on the use of dogs to detect tunnels, mines and booby-traps, lists of research projects and British lessons learned from Vietnam War 1969 \u2013 1969.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>AWM98, <a href=\"http:\/\/recordsearch.naa.gov.au\/SearchNRetrieve\/Interface\/DetailsReports\/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=3295256&amp;isAv=N\">R237\/1\/22\/3 PART 4<\/a>, [Headquarters, Australian Force Vietnam (HQ AFV):] Correspondence &#8211; General &#8211; FORS [Field Operations Research Section] &#8211; SAO [Senior Administrative Officer] &#8211; [Includes material on night sights and infrared devices, activities of FORS in Vietnam, water tanks and personnel detection radars] 1970 \u2013 1970.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>AWM279, <a href=\"http:\/\/recordsearch.naa.gov.au\/SearchNRetrieve\/Interface\/DetailsReports\/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=5193494&amp;isAv=N\">2\/6<\/a>, [FORS [Field Operations Research Section] 9] Evaluation Small Arms\/Munitions Detector in RVN [Republic of Vietnam] circa1969 &#8211; circa1969.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>AWM98, <a href=\"http:\/\/recordsearch.naa.gov.au\/SearchNRetrieve\/Interface\/DetailsReports\/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=779864&amp;isAv=N\">R310\/2\/11 PART 1<\/a>, [Headquarters, Australian Force Vietnam (HQ AFV):] [Establishments] &#8211; Field Operational Research Section (FORS) Attachment, South Vietnam [File contains documents relating to the posting, strength, accreditation, and tasks of FORS in Vietnam, including description of tasks from Dec 1965, reports on R&amp;D items of equipment, an extensive report from the Scientific Advisor to US MACV on Data Sources in South Vietnam; a &#8216;sanitised&#8217; report from a Dept of Supply secondment during 1970 and 1971 dealing with FORS activities, reports on various visits and projected schedule for a AFV withdrawal in 1971-72.] 1965 \u2013 1971.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The Australian War Memorial collection also contains a large selection of files relating to trials of experimental equipment. Some examples are:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>AWM98, item R8465\/1\/6, Individual Equipment Containers \u2013 Water Collapsible.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>AWM98, item R895\/1\/1, Water-s, General \u2013 Water Jellying Compound.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>AWM103, item R990\/500\/2, RAASC Supplies, Tests and Trials, Aust 1 Man Ration.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>AWM98, item R980\/500\/53, HQ AFV, Stores and Equipment, Tests and Trials, M67 and L14A1 Carl Gustav.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>AWM103, item R980\/500\/131, HQ 1ATF, Stores and Equipment, Tests and Trials \u2013 Night Scope \u2013 Rifle Sight.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>AWM103, item R980\/500\/128, HQ 1ATF, Stores and Equipment \u2013 Tests and Trials \u2013 Single Point Small Arms Weapon Sight.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>AWM103, item R980\/500\/24, HQ 1ATF Stores and Equipment \u2013 Tests and Trials \u2013 Hitachi Portable Transceiver (Squad radios).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>E.S. Holt describes the role and activities of the Field Operational Research Section &#8211; Vietnam (FORS-V).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[78,45,44],"class_list":["post-1241","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-articles","tag-featured-articles","tag-fors","tag-operational-research","no-post-thumbnail"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1241","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1241"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1241\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1266,"href":"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1241\/revisions\/1266"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1241"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1241"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vietnam-war.au\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1241"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}